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Abstract 
This paper provides new empirical evidence relevant to the debate over the 
desirability of reforms to the way that financial markets and the international 
community deal with sovereign debt crises. In particular, given the ongoing 
opposition of investors and some sovereigns to greater use of collective action 
clauses (CACs) in emerging market bonds, we present new evidence on the way 
that financial markets have priced the use or non-use of CACs. 
We supplement existing evidence that the use of CACs in Euromarket issues has 
not affected yields on new bond issues through an event study that shows that 
decisions by issuers to change away from, or to, the use of CACs has also not 
affected the pricing of issuers’ existing stock of debt in the secondary market. We 
also provide new evidence on the pricing of a large sample of bonds in the 
secondary market on 31 January 2003. The data show that even after the intense 
debate about sovereign debt restructuring through 2002, the inclusion or absence of 
CACs still had no economically or statistically significant impact on yields as of 
early 2003. Hence we conclude that investors still had not focused on which bonds 
have CACs, or that they believe that the inclusion of CACs is not relevant to the 
pricing of debt. 
The empirical evidence therefore suggests there is no good reason why there 
cannot be greater use of CACs, including in bonds sold into the US market. A 
strong case can be made that investors will benefit from well-targeted reforms to 
the way that sovereign debt crises are handled. Indeed, Mexico’s successful sale of 
global bonds with CACs on 26 February 2003 – the first placement of bonds with 
CACs by an emerging market sovereign into the US market – suggests that the 
long-held opposition to CACs in some quarters may be easing. 
JEL Classification Numbers: F34, G12, G15 
Keywords: bond yields, collective action clauses, debt restructuring, 
emerging markets, sovereign debt crises  
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DO COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES INFLUENCE BOND 
YIELDS? NEW EVIDENCE FROM EMERGING MARKETS 
Mark Gugiatti and Anthony Richards 
1. Introduction 
There has recently been much debate over crisis prevention and resolution. 
Although much has been done on crisis prevention, it may be inevitable that there 
will be occasional sovereign debt crises such as those experienced in recent years 
by Argentina, Ecuador, Russia and Ukraine. Crises such as these are usually 
extremely costly for both investors and the citizens of the affected countries, and 
have prompted debate over what changes could be made to the way that financial 
markets and the international community deal with sovereign debt crises. 
However, there is little agreement over what reforms are desirable. The debate 
appears to hinge on different views as to how to meet the goal of facilitating the 
speedy restructuring of unsustainable debt burdens in a way that minimises both 
the dislocation to the affected country and the loss of value to creditors, while 
ensuring that borrowers that can repay their obligations do so. 
Official proposals have focused on either a contractual or a statutory approach to 
the problem. A contractual approach would involve borrowers placing clauses in 
their debt contracts that would spell out the various procedures that might be 
followed in the event that debt servicing problems arise, including procedures for 
qualified majorities of bondholders to change the payment terms of bonds 
(see Taylor (2002)). These clauses would draw heavily on the collective action 
clauses (CACs) that already exist in many bonds issued in the Euromarket. 
Proposals for a statutory approach are continuing to evolve as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) develops its proposal for a sovereign debt restructuring 
mechanism (SDRM).1 The purpose of the SDRM would be to move the framework 
for dealing with sovereign debt problems closer to the bankruptcy frameworks that 
exist within national economies. An important aspect of these two approaches is 
that neither would force restructuring on creditors or borrowers: they would simply 
                                           
1  See IMF (2003) for further details of the proposed sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. 2 
 
provide a framework by which a super-majority (say 75 per cent) of creditors could 
come together and agree to change the payment terms if they viewed it as being in 
their collective interest. 
Despite support for both the contractual and statutory approaches from the 
international organisations and major industrial countries, there has been little 
support for either approach from either investors or emerging market issuers. 
Investors (and the financial markets more generally) were for a long time strongly 
opposed to a contractual solution (wider use of collective action clauses), arguing 
that the status quo of voluntary exchange offers for dealing with debt problems was 
sufficiently flexible to deal with debt servicing problems.2 Although private sector 
organisations have recently been more supportive of a contractual approach and 
have drafted a set of model CACs,3 the strength of this support is unclear, with 
some arguing that they are unwilling to discuss moving toward a contractual 
approach as long as the statutory approach remains on the table. 
Emerging market borrowers have also tended to oppose most reforms, with some 
citing concern that reforms would increase their borrowing costs. In many respects 
the lack of support from borrowing countries appears to be related to opposition 
from financial markets. Indeed, Boorman (2003) notes that despite the absence of 
credible evidence that collective action clauses have increased spreads ‘the private 
sector seems to be going around to emerging market countries and trying to scare 
the hell out of them about the fact that either the use of collective action clauses or 
the SDRM will lead to an increase in spreads’. An important recent development, 
however, was the inclusion of CACs in a global bond issue by Mexico on 
26 February 2003, which we discuss further in the conclusion.4 
                                           
2  See e.g., Chamberlin (2002) for a summary of private sector views from the head of one 
leading trade association. 
3  See the 31 January 2003 letter from the heads of seven private sector organisations to G-10 
Finance Ministers, available at <http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/Final_merged.pdf>. 
4  Global bonds are bonds issued simultaneously into the US market, Euromarket and other 
markets. This appears to be the first sovereign issue into the US market with CACs, although 
there are instances of bonds issued into the Euromarket under New York governing law that 
include CACs (see Footnote 9). 3 
 
This paper makes no judgment on the relative benefits of a contractual versus a 
statutory approach.5 Instead, it presents new evidence, based on market prices, 
about the way that markets have viewed contractual clauses that can facilitate debt 
restructuring. In particular, since a significant proportion of the outstanding stock 
of sovereign bonds – from mature as well as emerging market countries – already 
includes CACs, we are able to analyse the pricing of bonds with and without 
CACs. 
This paper adds to the literature on the pricing of CACs in two regards. First, it 
provides an additional test as to the historical pricing of CACs. In particular, 
previous empirical evidence has suggested that the use of CACs in a bond issue did 
not increase the cost of borrowing for that particular bond.6 Previous evidence has 
also shown that the use of CACs did not affect bond pricing in the secondary 
market after the issuance of the bond.7 However, if the use or non-use of CACs is 
something that markets consider as relevant in pricing bonds (e.g., because it 
signals something about repayment probabilities), then we would expect that when 
a new bond issue occurs that involves a change in the contractual terms (towards or 
away from CACs), this should result in a change in the value of the existing stock 
of issuance from that issuer. We test this hypothesis via an event study and find no 
evidence that decisions about the contractual terms of new bond issues have 
affected the pricing of the existing stock of debt. This is an additional piece of 
evidence that CACs have historically not been viewed as a factor that influenced 
bond yields. 
                                           
5 One obvious difference, however, is that a statutory approach would be a more 
comprehensive solution, since it would overcome problems such as aggregation of different 
bond issues (see e.g., Boorman (2003)). 
6  See Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (forthcoming) and Tsatsaronis (1999). By contrast, 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) suggest that CACs decrease borrowing costs for higher-rated 
issuers and increase borrowing costs for lower-rated issuers, though Becker, Richards and 
Thaicharoen suggest these results may be due to data problems and the instrumental variables 
technique used by the former to control for possible endogeneity in the use of CACs. 
7 See Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (forthcoming), Petas and Rahman (1999), and 
Dixon and Wall (2000). 4 
 
Second, this paper provides a very recent update on the pricing of bonds with and 
without CACs. Although Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (forthcoming) have 
shown that the use of CACs had no impact on the pricing of a large sample of 
bonds in the secondary market in mid 1998 and mid 2000, much has happened 
since then. In particular, the November 2001 IMF proposal for the SDRM and the 
default by Argentina – the largest emerging markets issuer – have highlighted the 
problems of debt crises, which may have resulted in new focus by market 
participants on the role of CACs in pricing emerging market sovereign bonds. We 
therefore test whether there is a significant difference in the pricing of bonds with 
and without CACs as of 31 January 2003. The results indicate that there is still no 
evidence that CACs have had an economically or statistically significant impact 
upon bond pricing in the secondary market. Accordingly, we conclude that market 
participants have still not – as of early 2003 – focused on which bonds have CACs, 
or that they do not believe that the presence or absence of CACs should influence 
the value of a bond. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some background 
on the nature and use of CACs. In Section 3 we present the results of the event 
study of decisions about CACs and their impact on the pricing of the outstanding 
stock of debt over 1994–2003. Section 4 contains the tests of the pricing of the 
CACs in a large sample of bonds in the secondary market on 31 January 2003. 
Section 5 concludes. 5 
 
2.  Background on Collective Action Clauses 
Collective action clauses have been commonly used in international sovereign 
bond documentation since becoming market practice under English law for 
corporate bonds in the nineteenth century.8 The CACs included in modern-day 
sovereign bonds generally contain two main types of provisions: 
•  majority restructuring clauses: enabling changes to be made to the financial 
terms of a bond instrument by a qualified majority (say 75 per cent) of 
bondholders, thus binding all holders of that bond issuance to the new terms; 
and 
•  majority enforcement clauses: allowing a majority of bondholders to limit the 
ability of an individual creditor to enforce its rights against the sovereign 
(e.g., to declare the bond payable, or to initiate litigation) in the event of 
default. 
Although the design of these provisions may vary amongst bonds, they typically 
include – in the case of majority restructuring clauses – rules related to the conduct 
of bondholder meetings, quorum requirements and voting rules, while majority 
enforcement clauses often specify that the proceeds of any litigation against the 
sovereign be shared amongst all creditors. 
While CACs are traditionally included in bonds issued under English governing 
law, and also in bonds issued under Luxembourg and Japanese governing laws, 
they are not traditional in sovereign bonds issued under New York or German 
governing laws. In the case of the US, this has been a matter of market practice 
rather than legal requirement. In particular, although the Trust Indenture Act of 
1939 precludes the modification of payment terms without unanimous approval of 
all holders of corporate bonds, the law does not cover sovereign bonds, which 
could contain CACs. Instead, sovereign bonds issued into the US market have – at 
least until the path-breaking Mexican issue of 26 February 2003 – used similar 
                                           
8  See IMF (2002) for further details of the nature and use of CACs. 6 
 
documentation to the corporate indentures that US investors are familiar with, 
thereby not including CACs.9 
Because CACs are traditional in some markets but not in others, it turns out that 
sovereign borrowers frequently switch between the use and non-use of CACs in 
their bond issuance. Table 1 provides data from Dealogic’s Bondware database for 
the 20 largest emerging market sovereign issuers over the period 
January 1991–January 2003. We separate issuance in international markets into 
three groups, based on the governing law of the bond contracts. The first includes 
bonds issued under English, Luxembourg and Japanese governing laws, for which 
the use of CACs is customary. The second includes the two major governing laws, 
New York and German, for which the use of CACs is not customary. The third 
group includes other governing laws. Table 1 indicates that 17 of the 20 most 
active sovereign borrowers have switched between issuing bonds with and without 
 
                                           
9  However, there are exceptions to the correspondence between governing law and existence of 
CACs in emerging market bonds. One exception is the case of Brady bonds, which are 
typically under English governing law, but exclude CACs for historical reasons. Another 
oft-cited exception is a (non-sovereign) US$300 million Euromarket issue by a Thai public 
utility in October 1998 with New York governing law, but which nonetheless included CACs. 
  We have investigated further as to whether there may be additional Euromarket issues with 
New York governing law that include CACs, and searched for the offering documents for all 
Euromarket issues under New York governing law with an issue size of at least 
US$400 million. Of the 15 bonds where we were able to check offering documents, we found 
6 cases where a bond issued under New York governing law appears to include CACs. These 
included 2 issues from each of Egypt, Lebanon and Qatar. Accordingly, the analysis that 
follows adjusts for this additional information on the use of CACs. 
  The results of this exercise are something of a caveat (albeit probably not a major one) to the 
series of papers that have studied the pricing of CACs in sovereign issuance, assuming a 
perfect correspondence between governing law and the presence of CACs. However, we 
suspect that the overall conclusion from most earlier work – that CACs do not affect bond 
pricing – remains quite robust. Indeed, we suspect that this evidence that CACs are used more 
frequently in the Euromarket than had earlier been assumed strengthens the case for the 
proposition that CACs have not previously been noticed by investors and a fortiori have not 
increased borrowing costs. 7 
 
CACs over this period.10 Furthermore, 96 per cent of the total issuance of these 20 
borrowers is from issuers who have used both types of contractual form. 
At one level, the data in Table 1 might be viewed as comprehensive evidence that 
the existence or absence of CACs cannot be a major influence on borrowing costs. 
In particular, if the presence or absence of CACs were a major influence on 
borrowing costs, we would expect borrowers to decide which type of contractual 
form provided the cheapest (or otherwise most appropriate) form of financing for 
them, and then to always use those contractual terms. By contrast, borrowers 
switch frequently between contractual forms, suggesting that the presence or 
absence of CACs is not a major influence on borrowing costs. 
However, this view might be somewhat simplistic, given that issuance in certain 
currencies or certain markets may in practice constrain the use or non-use of CACs 
based on what is traditional for that particular market. For example, issuance in 
Japanese yen is invariably under Japanese governing law and therefore inevitably 
includes CACs. Accordingly, in the analysis that follows, we concentrate on a 
subset of issuance where one can plausibly make the case that there is some choice 
in the use or non-use of governing law. In particular, we focus on issuance in US 
dollars and euro (and some of its predecessor currencies). In each case, an analysis 
of governing law usage indicates that borrowers have the choice between issuance 
in the Euromarket with CACs, or the Euromarket or US (or global) market without 
CACs. 
                                           
10 The number of sovereigns to have used both types of contractual form would also include 
Korea if we also included quasi-sovereign issuance in the table. In particular, the Republic of 
Korea has made only two bond issues in its own name (in April 1998) but the state-owned 
Korea Development Bank was a frequent borrower prior to this (sometimes using CACs), and 
was viewed as representing a sovereign credit. 8 
 
Table 1: Use of Collective Action Clauses in International Bond Issuance 









Argentina 18.1  38.6 0.6 57.3 
Mexico 4.9  33.0  0.1  38.0 
Turkey 12.9  24.0  –  36.8 
Brazil 12.3  20.3  –  32.6 
Hungary 10.1  6.1  1.1  17.3 
Russia 14.0  1.8  –  15.8 
Colombia 0.8  12.0  0.1  12.9 
Philippines 5.1  7.3  –  12.4 
Lebanon 3.1  6.5  – 9.6 
Venezuela 0.3 8.3  0.1  8.7 
South Africa  2.9  4.7  –  7.6 
China 1.9  5.7  –  7.5 
Poland 4.6  2.0  –  6.6 
Panama – 4.2  –  4.2 
Malaysia 0.8  3.3  – 4.0 
Korea –  4.0  –  4.0 
Uruguay 0.4  3.3  – 3.7 
Croatia 3.3  0.2  0.1  3.6 
Ukraine 3.5  – –  3.5 
Tunisia 1.9  1.4  –  3.3 
Total 100.9  186.4  2.1  289.4 
Notes:  The data are calculations by the authors based on data from Bondware and include all bond issuance into 
international markets by those emerging market sovereigns that are among the 20 largest issuers over
January 1991–January 2003. The first column of data includes issuance under English, Japanese and 
Luxembourg governing laws, while the second column includes issuance under New York and German




3.  Did Decisions on Collective Action Clauses on New Issues 
Affect Secondary Market Spreads? 
3.1 Introduction 
The argument that the use or non-use of CACs should influence yields and 
borrowing costs is usually made along the following lines. Opponents of CACs 
have generally argued that the likelihood that borrowers will choose to honour 
their obligations may be altered by the use or non-use of CACs, and that the 
inclusion of CACs will signal a reduced likelihood of full repayment to 
bondholders. In essence the argument is that if restructuring is made easier then 
borrowers are more likely to seek to restructure and reduce their obligations, even 
if they are perfectly able to honour them. By contrast, proponents of CACs have 
typically argued that history shows that sovereign borrowers do not willingly seek 
to renege on their contracts so that the use or non-use of CACs contains no signal 
about creditworthiness. However, in the event of the financial distress of the 
borrower the inclusion of CACs will increase the probability of a smooth 
restructuring rather than a messy default, and will therefore result in reduced losses 
to bondholders. 
The tests in this section make no assumptions about which of these effects is the 
dominant one, and whether proponents or opponents of CACs are ‘correct’. 
Instead, we initially simply seek to test if we can find any evidence that the use of 
CACs has affected yields at all, without any priors about which direction this effect 
should take. 
Our test is based on the notion that if the decision to use or not use CACs contains 
information that is important to investors, then it influences not only the value of a 
bond at the time of issue but also affects the value of the outstanding stock of 
previously issued bonds. For example, if a borrower has previously issued bonds 
without (with) CACs, then the decision to issue bonds with (without) CACs may – 
if there is any merit to the argument of the opponents of CACs – signal a decline 
(improvement) in the creditworthiness of the borrower. This should be reflected 
not only in higher (lower) borrowing costs for the bond that contains the change in 
contractual terms, but also higher (lower) yields on the outstanding stock of bonds, 10 
 
because the latest issuance decision conveys information to the market that is 
relevant for the valuation of those bonds. 
Alternatively, even if there is no signal about the borrower’s willingness to repay, 
the arguments of the proponents of CACs might suggest there could still be an 
impact on yields, albeit in the opposite direction to the effect posited in the 
previous paragraph. For example, a shift towards CACs may convey information 
about the likelihood of a smooth (and value-preserving) restructuring rather than a 
messy (and value-destroying) default. For example, if the probability of a smooth 
restructuring is a function of the proportion of bonds with or without CACs, then 
decisions to change the type of issuance convey information about the likely ease 
of restructuring and could therefore result in changes in yields and prices in the 
secondary market. 
3.2 Methodology 
The preceding discussion can be re-expressed as a testable hypothesis: if the use or 
non-use of CACs is value-relevant for investors, changes in the nature of the 
majority action clause relative to previous issuance will impact on the value of the 
issuer’s outstanding stock of debt. 
We test this hypothesis via an event study of abnormal returns in the secondary 
market pricing of the existing stock of debt. We divide all debt issues (or events, 
denoted by i) in our sample based on whether the issue included CACs or not, and 
whether it represented a change in the use of CACs from the previous issue. This 
enables us to create four mutually exclusive dummy variables: D1i, where the 
issuer did not use CACs in either the current issue or the previous issue; D2i, where 
the issuer used CACs in both the current issue and the previous issue; D3i, where 
the issuer used CACs in the current issue but not in the previous issue; and D4i, 
where the issuer did not use CACs in the current issue, but did so in the previous 
issue. 
One key methodological question in conducting the test is the definition of the 
abnormal return and the ‘event window’. For every event we know the day when 
the bond issue was announced to the market as occurring on that day. If this was 
indeed the day that the market learned everything about the issue, then we could 11 
 
conduct an event study for abnormal returns on that day. However, for most bond 
issues, the marketing of an issue typically occurs for some period before the 
announcement to the market that the issue is taking place on the day in question. 
Any assumption of the standard period of ‘pre-marketing’ will be somewhat 
arbitrary, but for the purposes of this study we choose to focus on a five day event 
window, starting three trading days before the announcement, and ending one day 
afterwards. Thus treating the day of the announcement of the issue as t = 0, our 
event window is defined as the period from t = –3 to t = +1. We would not argue 
that all investors become aware of the nature of the contractual terms of the issue 
in this window, merely that a sufficiently large fraction of investors learn about the 
terms of the bond in this window to have an effect on secondary market pricing if 
the news about the contractual terms is indeed value-relevant. 
Given the definition of the event window, we define the ‘estimation window’ as 
the 100 day interval from t = –103 to t = –4. We then estimate a market model for 
this window for each event i and borrower j, by regressing the daily return on the 
relevant emerging market issuer (rijt) on the return on a broad portfolio of emerging 
market bonds (rimt). To take account of possible illiquidity in secondary market 
bond pricing, we estimate our market model using overlapping five-day returns. 
The equation we estimate is therefore given by: 
  t , t , ij t , t , im t , t , ij r r 5 5 1 0 5 − − − + + = ε β β  (1) 
Using the parameter estimates from Equation (1) we calculate a predicted return 
for the five-day event window, and then define the abnormal return (r
abn) as the 
actual return less the predicted return. We then regress this abnormal return on the 
four dummy variables for the nature of the contractual terms, and the size of the 
bond issue as a ratio to national GDP, denoted issuesizet:11 
  i i i i i i
abn
t , ijt issuesize D D D D r ε β β β β β + + + + + = + − 4 3 2 1 0 1 3 4 3 2 1  (2) 
In addition to estimating Equation (2) using abnormal returns, we also estimate it 
in standardised terms, i.e., by dividing the event-window abnormal returns by the 
standard error of the predicted return (based on Newey-West standard errors to 
                                           
11 Since the four dummy variables are mutually exclusive, we do not include a constant term. 12 
 
account for the moving average error term that is introduced through the use of 
overlapping returns). The distribution of these standardised abnormal returns will 
have a unit variance if event-window returns are drawn from the same distribution 
as estimation-window returns. 
3.3 Data 
Data for this part of the study are based on bond issuance data in the Bondware 
database and secondary market bond index data from JPMorgan Chase. 
From Bondware, we obtained data for all issuance (excluding Brady bonds) by 
sovereigns rated A+/A1 or lower by Standard and Poor’s, and Moody’s. We then 
focused on issuance in US$ or major European currencies into the Euromarket, US 
market or global market. We then limited the sample to all issuance that occurred 
under New York, German, English or Luxembourg governing laws. Since CACs 
are not customary in bonds issued under the first two governing laws, those bonds 
represent the issuance that occurred without CACs, while bonds issued under the 
latter two governing laws represent our sample of bonds issued with CACs. 
The resulting sample of bonds from Bondware represents a sample where we can 
reasonably say that even after deciding on the currency of issue, borrowers had a 
choice in whether or not to use CACs. We then focus on countries that switched 
between using or not using CACs on at least two occasions in the sample. 
We obtained data for total return indices for the existing secondary market stock of 
bonds from JPMorgan Chase. We use the EMBI Global indices which are available 
on a daily basis from the start of 1994. These indices measure the daily change in 
the valuation of the stock of securities issued by each country that meet certain 
requirements in terms of size and liquidity of each issue. In each case we required 
the existence of a sufficiently long time-series of returns to enable the estimation of 
a market model prior to the event window. We use the US dollar indices in all 
cases, even in cases where the bond issue was denominated in a European 
currency. The implicit assumption is that the two markets are not totally segmented 
and that news that is revealed in one market will also be reflected in pricing in the 
other market. 13 
 
The intersection of the Bondware and JPMorgan Chase data leaves us with data 
from 10 countries which have switched at least twice between using and not using 
CACs, and for which we have the required secondary market returns data. One 
potential problem with the data is that they are heavily weighted toward Argentina, 
given that country’s heavy issuance over 1991–2001. To reduce the weight of 
Argentina, we limit our universe of Argentinean issues to those greater than 
US$400 million in size. 
The resulting sample includes 204 bond issues from the 10 countries, including 
Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, 
Turkey and Venezuela. The sample includes 87 events where the borrower 
switched in its usage of CACs (43 to using CACs, and 44 from using CACs), and 
117 events where there was no change in contractual form (26 using CACs and 91 
not using CACs). 
3.4 Results 
The data for abnormal returns for the 204 events described above have a mean that 
is slightly negative, at around –0.15 per cent. This might be viewed as evidence 
that new issuance is typically associated with a very slight fall in the value of the 
existing stock of debt, because it represents an addition to the outstanding stock of 
debt. However, when we add a variable for the size of the new issuance as an 
explanator of the abnormal return, the parameter estimate is far from statistically 
significant (although it is negative) so we cannot attribute much of the average 
negative abnormal return to a ‘supply-shock’ explanation.12 
The results from estimating Equation (2) are provided in Table 2. If the use of 
CACs was viewed negatively by the markets, changes from using CACs to not 
using CACs should be associated with positive abnormal returns whereas changes 
to using CACs should be associated with negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, 
decisions to continue the use of CACs should be associated with more negative 
returns than decisions to continue not using CACs. However, the first column of 
                                           
12 It may not be surprising that the change in secondary market prices is largely independent of 
the size of the new issue if issuers typically have sufficient flexibility in new issuance to 
adjust its timing and magnitude to minimise the impact on the existing yield curve (i.e., by not 
proceeding with a planned issue if it is likely to result in a substantial increase in yields, and 
in increasing the size of an issue if there is strong demand for it). 14 
 
results provides no support for these propositions with none of the parameter 
estimates being statistically significant. 
Table 2: Do Decisions on the Use or Non-use of CACs Influence Secondary 
Market Abnormal Returns? 
  Dependent variable 
Explanatory variable  Abnormal return  Standardised 
abnormal return 
D1    
CACs not included, no change 
in contractual form 
–0.22(1.8) –0.23(1.7) 
D2    
CACs included, no change in 
contractual form 
–0.05(0.3) –0.26(1.3) 
D3    
Change in contractual form 
to CACs 
–0.07(0.5) –0.06(0.4) 
D4    
Change in contractual form to 
excluding CACs 
0.08(0.5) –0.08(0.5) 
Issue size/GDP  –0.14(0.9)  –0.14(0.7) 
Adjusted R
2 0.0012  –0.0073 
Notes:  This table shows the results from an event study to investigate if decisions on whether or not CACs are
included in new bond issues affect the pricing of a country’s existing debt in the secondary market. The 
results show estimates of Equation (2) with the dependent variable first defined as the abnormal return (in
per cent) around the event date and then as the standardised abnormal return around the event date. The
variables D1–D4 are mutually exclusive variables defined by whether or not CACs are included in a new
issue, and whether this was a change from the previous issue. T-statistics are shown in parentheses based 
on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
 
Similarly, the results for standardised abnormal returns also fail to show any 
evidence consistent with the view that the use of CACs is penalised by the 
financial markets. Indeed, what is striking about these results is that the adjusted 
R
2 for both regressions are approximately zero, suggesting the abnormal returns on 15 
 
the existing stock of debt are essentially independent of decisions about the 
governing law of bonds (and the size of the new issue).13 
These results are complementary to, but consistent with, the results of Becker, 
Richards and Thaicharoen (forthcoming) and Tsatsaronis (1999). Whereas those 
authors show that an issuer’s decisions about the use or non-use of CACs have 
historically had no impact on the pricing of its new debt issues, the current results 
show that these decisions have also had no impact on the pricing of issuer’s 
existing stock of debt. These results would appear consistent with the reality that 
issuers have frequently switched between using CACs and not using CACs, and 
investors have been apparently unconcerned by decisions on the exact form of the 
contractual terms of bonds. 
4.  Were Collective Action Clauses Priced in Early 2003? 
4.1 Methodology 
In this section, we largely follow the methodology of Becker, Richards and 
Thaicharoen (forthcoming) in examining the impact of the presence or absence of 
CACs in the pricing of a large sample of bonds trading on the secondary market. 
Whereas those authors concentrated on market pricing as of 30 June 1998 and 
30 June 2000, we focus on a more recent date, namely 31 January 2003. 
Our dependent variable is the log of the ratio of the yield on the emerging market 
bond i to the yield on the corresponding mature market benchmark bond, and is 
denoted by log(ri,em/ri,bm).14 We initially include the full sample of bonds from all 
emerging market countries. We regress the yield variable against a number of 
variables for the characteristics of the bond. These include: the average credit 
                                           
13  As a robustness check, we have also examined the impact of including credit ratings 
interaction terms with the dummy variables, and still find no evidence that choices on 
contractual terms affect abnormal returns. In addition, since 131 of the 204 events in the 
sample relate to just three issuers (Argentina, Brazil and Turkey) we have also estimated the 
equations excluding these three large issuers. The results are little changed.  
14 The reason we use this transformation rather than the log of the spread is that the latter 
approaches negative infinity as the spread approaches zero, implying that bonds with very low 
spreads may have an undue impact on the estimates. 16 
 
rating for the bond from Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (rati);15 the modified 
duration of the bond (duri); the US dollar equivalent of the amount of each bond on 
issue (sizei); and a dummy for US dollar-denominated (rather than European 
currency denominated) bonds (dollari). 
Since theory offers little guidance as to the exact functional form of the 
relationship between the explanatory variables, we tested different functional 
forms in search of a parsimonious equation that explained the data reasonably well. 
The basic equation is as follows: 
 
() i i i
i i i i i bm , i em , i
dollar size log
rat dur dur rat rat ) r / r log(
ε β β
β β β β β
+ + +




2 1 0  (3) 
The squared rating term is included to allow for a non-linear relationship for 
lower-rated bonds, and the term interacting the duration and ratings variable is 
included to allow for the observation that, for poorly rated borrowers, yields often 
fall rather than rise with duration. 
We then included a dummy variable (CACi) taking the value of unity if the bond 
includes CACs (based on English governing law). In addition, since some have 
argued that the impact of CACs on yields should be somewhat dependent upon the 
credit quality of the issuer, we also included an interaction term with the credit 
rating variable. 
Although most major emerging market issuers have issued bonds with and without 
CACs, many of the bonds in our sample of secondary market yields are from 
countries that have issued bonds with only one type of contractual form. If the 
decision by countries to choose a particular contractual form were related to their 
creditworthiness (or to some other determinant of spreads), then it would be 
possible that estimates of the impact of governing law might be biased due to 
endogeneity. In practice we believe this is not a major issue, based both on market 
 
                                           
15  The credit rating variable is expressed in terms of the standard numerical rating, with 
AAA/Aaa set to 1 and B–/B3 set to 16. 17 
 
practice,16 and because we expect that our credit rating variable is a fairly 
comprehensive measure of the information about creditworthiness that is available 
at any time. 
Nonetheless, to address the possible problem of endogeneity we also estimate an 
equation for yields including only those countries that have bonds outstanding with 
and without CACs. As discussed by Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen 
(forthcoming) this is equivalent to a fixed effects correction for endogeneity and 
enables us to avoid the problems of endogeneity corrections based on instrumental 
variables. In estimating this model, we include a dummy variable for each country, 
but no longer need to include the credit ratings variables. 
4.2 Data 
We obtained data for secondary market yields for a large sample of sovereign 
bonds (excluding Brady bonds) from the Merrill Lynch Global Index database. We 
also obtained data for the currency and modified duration of each bond from 
Merrill Lynch. We focus on data for 31 January 2003. The sample includes 
sovereign borrowers rated by Standard and Poor’s, and Moody’s between A+/A1 
and B–/B3. We omit issuance in Japanese yen, and limit our sample to issuance in 
US dollars and major European currencies. 
We obtained data on the governing law of all bonds in our sample from Bondware 
or Bloomberg. Data on long-term foreign currency debt ratings were obtained from 
Bloomberg and transformed into a numerical variable (as described in 
Footnote 15). In the event of a split rating between Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s we use the average numerical rating. 
                                           
16 Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (forthcoming) provide analysis showing that the use of 
governing law is highly correlated with factors such as the currency and market of issue, and 
the nationality of the investment bank that is the lead manager of the issue. Dammers (2002) 
also notes that the choice of governing law and use of CACs is not a primary decision for 
issuers or investors, but is likely to reflect the type of documentation typically used by the 
lead manager’s lawyers. 18 
 
Our final sample includes 216 bonds from 39 countries.17 The sample of countries 
with bonds both with and without CACs includes 119 bonds from 13 countries, 
including Brazil, Croatia, Hungary, Israel, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Tunisia and Turkey. The latter group 
includes 48 bonds with CACs and 71 bonds without CACs. 
4.3 Results 
The initial specification tests to determine the functional form shown in 
Equation (3) were conducted before the inclusion of the CACs variable(s). In 
addition to the variables shown in Equation (3), we include separate country 
dummies for three countries (Brazil, Mexico and Turkey) that each represent more 
than 10 per cent of the total number of bonds in our sample (though the results that 
follow are not dependent on this). The parameter estimates for the basic model are 
shown in the first column of results of Table 3.18 The results show that yields are 
higher for bonds with poor credit ratings and longer durations, and for dollar-
denominated issues (relative to issuance in European currencies). The signs of each 
of these estimated impacts accords with conventional wisdom on market pricing, 
and the interaction terms also take the expected signs. The estimate on the variable 
for the size of the issue is negative, which may reflect a liquidity effect, with larger 
bonds with greater liquidity having lower yields. 
We test for the importance of CACs in determining yields by first including a 
simple zero/one dummy variable that takes the value of one for English law bonds. 
The results in the second column suggest that the use of CACs was associated 
lower yields for the full sample of bonds. Although the parameter estimate is 
statistically significant, we hesitate to rely too much on any particular estimate, 
given that the previous work of Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (forthcoming) 
                                           
17  The countries include Bahrain, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Guatemala, Hungary, 
Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, South Africa, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Uruguay. Based on the information in Footnote 9, we 
define six issues by Egypt, Lebanon and Qatar as including CACs, even though they occurred 
under New York governing law. 
18 For brevity, we do not show the separate country dummies for Brazil, Mexico and Turkey for 
the first three specifications, nor the 13 country dummies in the last two specifications. 19 
 
shows that such coefficient estimates tend to jump around somewhat, while never 
deviating much from zero. 
We then test whether the impact of CACs might be somewhat dependent upon 
credit quality by including a term that interacts the CAC dummy with the 
numerical ratings variable. The results in the third column indicate that the 
interaction term is completely insignificant, and that the basic CACs variable is no 
longer significant, although the parameter estimate remains negative. 
Table 3: Did the Use of Collective Action Clauses Affect Secondary Market 
Yields on 31 January 2003? 
  Sample – all 216 bonds 
from 39 issuers 
Sample – 119 bonds from 13 
issuers with bonds both with 

















Constant –0.293(1.4)  –0.283(1.4) –0.314(1.5)  na  na 
Rating 0.100(2.9)  0.098(2.9) 0.103(3.0)  na  na 
Rating-squared 0.002(1.5)  0.002(1.6) 0.002(1.5)  na  na 
Duration 0.066(4.7)  0.068(4.7) 0.068(4.6)  0.054(3.4)  0.055(3.3) 
Duration* rating  –0.009(6.2)  –0.009(6.2) –0.009(6.2)  –0.009(5.5)  –0.009(5.4) 
Dollar-denominated 0.152(4.7)  0.109(3.0) 0.111(3.0)  0.123(4.4)  0.117(4.0) 
Log (amount)  –0.053(3.6)  –0.043(2.6) –0.043(2.6)  –0.031(1.2)  –0.025(0.9) 
CACs na  –0.087(2.8) –0.049(0.6)  0.022(0.9)  –0.057(0.8) 
CACs* rating  na  na  –0.003(0.5)  na  0.007(1.1) 
Adjusted R
2 0.891  0.896  0.895 0.959 0.958 
Notes:  This table shows estimates of Equation (3) to estimate the effect of the inclusion of CACs on yields on
emerging market bonds. The dependent variable is given by log(ri,em/ri,bm), i.e., the log of the ratio of the
yield on the emerging market bond relative to the yield on the corresponding mature market benchmark
bond. T-statistics are shown in parentheses and are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
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When we limit our sample to 13 countries to conduct a test equivalent to the 
fixed-effects endogeneity correction, we exclude the rating and rating-squared 
variables, and instead include separate country dummies for each country. The 
results are shown in the fourth column, and for brevity exclude the parameter 
estimates for the country dummies. The results indicate that the CACs variable is 
now modestly positive, though it remains statistically insignificant. Our final set of 
results in the fifth column also includes a variable interacting the CACs variable 
with the numerical ratings variable. The point estimates suggest that CACs are 
associated with lower yields for high-rated issuers, but higher yields for low-rated 
issuers. However, these impacts are not statistically significant since both CACs 
variables are insignificant. 
We summarise the results from Table 3 (and other related results which are not 
shown) as follows. While some of the results suggest that CACs are associated 
with higher yields, others suggest they are associated with lower yields, and most 
of the estimates are insignificant: the only significant result was in the second 
column and was that CACs were associated with lower yields. This pattern of 
variable, but almost always insignificant, estimates is exactly what one would 
expect if CACs have no impact on yields. These results from a large sample of 
bonds in early 2003 are similar to the results obtained for earlier samples in 
Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (forthcoming) and suggest that the presence or 
absence of CACs is not a factor that is priced in the secondary market trading of 
emerging market bonds. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has presented further evidence that the inclusion of CACs has not 
influenced borrowing costs over the past decade or so. This is consistent with the 
weight of earlier empirical studies and is not surprising given the evidence cited in 
Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (forthcoming) that the market-place has 
historically paid no attention to this particular aspect of bond contracts. It is also 
consistent with observations by market participants (e.g., Petas and Rahman (1999) 
and Dammers (2002)) that the inclusion of CACs has simply not been an important 
decision variable for borrowers or investors. 21 
 
However, the paper has also presented new evidence about the pricing of bonds 
with and without CACs in the secondary market as of 31 January 2003. By 
comparing the yield on bonds issued in the Euromarket with CACs, and bonds 
issued in the US market and Euromarket without CACs, we show that the inclusion 
of CACs in bonds issued in the Euromarket did not impact secondary market yields 
as of early 2003. This suggests that even after the extensive debate over possible 
reforms to crisis resolution, financial market participants had still not focused on 
which bonds had CACs or that they did not believe that the existence or absence of 
CACs was relevant to the pricing of bonds. 
The challenge for greater use of CACs will be to change market convention and 
have these terms included in new bonds issued into the US market. The fact that 
the bond market currently prices existing bonds with and without CACs no 
differently, and that many US investors already hold bonds with CACs – 
apparently often without being aware of it – suggests that there is no good reason 
why bonds with CACs cannot be sold into the US market at similar yields to bonds 
without CACs. 
Of course, opponents of CACs might well argue that the use of CACs in all bonds, 
including in the US market, would represent a regime change and might signal that 
bond restructurings would become a more frequent phenomena and that investors 
will lose from this. However, the historical record provides little to suggest that 
emerging markets would rush to restructure in the event that there were reforms to 
make restructuring somewhat smoother. Indeed, recent crises suggest that elected 
officials and policy-makers in emerging markets are too slow rather than too eager 
to deal with incipient debt-servicing problems. The result of their delay in 
approaching their creditors is invariably to make losses for creditors far larger than 
they need be. One can therefore make a strong case that investors will benefit from 
well-targeted reforms – either the SDRM or greater use of CACs – that make it 
more likely that debt-servicing problems are addressed before they develop into 
full-blown crises. 22 
 
Indeed, the successful placement by Mexico of bonds with CACs into the US 
market on 26 February 2003 – which occurred after the results in this paper had 
been finalised – suggests that US investors have come to realise that the use of 
well-designed CACs is not inconsistent with protection of creditor rights. The 
placement of US$1 billion of bonds due in 2015 occurred at a yield that was almost 
exactly in line with Mexico’s 2013 and 2016 issues, which do not contain CACs. 
Following the issue a senior Mexican official was quoted as saying that ‘Now 
everyone understands that if properly designed, [CACs] represent a benefit both 
for the issuers and the holders, so there is no reason for a premium to be paid’.19 
                                           
19  See ‘Mexico Sells $1 Bln of Bonds With Default Clauses’, Bloomberg L.P., 
26 February 2003. 23 
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